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NOTES
MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES AND THE NEW
STANDARD OF FIDUCIARY DUTY-INTERPRETING
THE 1970 MUTUAL FUND ACT
In its closing days, the Ninety-First Congress legislated a new
standard for the courts to apply when called upon to determine the
propriety of existing levels of advisory compensation in the mutual
fund industry 1 The Investment Company Amendments Act of 19702
provides that the investment adviser of a fund has a "fiduciary duty"
to the fund with regard to the level of management fees it receives.
Under the new section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,3
either the Securities and Exchange Commission or a shareholder may
bring an action in a federal court to enforce this duty.4 The extensive

I investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547 (Dec. 14, 1970).
The Act became law on December 14, 1970, when it received the President's signature.
BNA Sc. R= & L. REP. No. 81, at A-25 (Dec. 16, 1970).
S. 2224 was passed by the Senate on May 26, 1969, and was passed by the House on
on September 23, 1970, with certain amendments. The relevant difference between the
bills was that the Hour version required a plaintiff to establish a breach of fiduciary duty
by "dear and convincing evidence:' HJL 17333, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 20 (1970). The
Senate merely placed an ordinary burden of proof on the plaintiff. S. 2224, 91st Cong.. Ist
Sess. § 20 (1969). The conferees adopted the Senate version in this regard. HR.RP. No.
1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). Their conference report was agreed to by the Senate
on November 30, 1970, and by the House on December 1. US. CoD, CoNO. & AD.NEws,
No. 14, at 6273 (Dec. 20, 1970).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-547 (Dec. 14, 1970).
$ 15 U.C. §§ 8fa-I to -52 (1964).
4 New I 36(b), amending 15 U..C. § 80a-35 (1964), proviJes
(b) For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by
such registered investment company, or by the security holdev thereof, to such investment adviser or any affliated person of such investment adviser. An action
may be brought under this subsection by the Commission [SEC], or by a security
holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against
such investment adviser, or any aufliated person of such investment adviser, or any
other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty
concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person. With
respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification
or approval of such compensation -or paymens or of contracts or other ar-
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number of shareholder derivative actions instituted under the preexisting law--a law less favorable to plaintiffs than the new legislation 6
-suggests that concerned shareholders will waste no time instituting
actions once the new law takes effect.7 Should shareholders fail to
proceed, the SEC will undoubtedly use its powers under the Act to
institute such actions.
The "fiduciary duty" language of the new law differs from the
"reasonableness" standard proposed by the SEC in 19668 and was only
proposed after some three years of legislative debate and lengthy SECindustry negotiations. 9 Considering the very flexible nature of a "fidurangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the shareholders
of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the court
as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained against any person
other than the recipient of such compensation or payments, and no damages
or other relief shall be granted against any person other than the recipient
of such compensation or payments. No award of damages shall be recoverable
for any period prior to one year before the action was instituted. Any award
of damages against such recipient shall be limited to the actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty and shall in no event exceed the
amount of compensation or payments received from such investment company,
or the security holders thereof, by such recipient.
(5) Any action pursuant to this subsection may be brought only in an
appropriate district court of the United States.
Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20 (Dec. 14, 1970).
The somewhat ambiguous language of § 36(b) indicates that not only the investment
adviser, but also others who receive compensation from the fund, including fund directors, persons affiliated with the adviser, the fund's principal underwriter, and fund officers,
may be attacked under § 36(b) with respect to that compensation.
5 Starting in 1959, over 50 suits were instituted under common law principles and the
Investment Company Act against mutual fund advisers charging excessive fees. SEC, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No.

2387, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT]; see, e.g., Kurach v.
Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Horenstein v. Waddel & Reed, Inc., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,678 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1970); Goodman v.
Von Der Heyde, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,541 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fn.
SEC. L. REP.
92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Elster v. Dreyfus, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH
FE. SEC. L. REP.

91,914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).

For a listing of many of these actions, see the chart contained in the 1967 House
hearings. Hearings on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
90-21, pt. 1, at 277-78 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings].
6 See text accompanying notes 109-42 infra.
7 Section 36(b), as amended, will not take effect until 18 months after enactment.
Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 30 (Dec. 14, 1970). The only reason for this delay appears to be to
allow advisers time to alter existing management contracts so as to conform to the new
fiduciary standard. See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1970).
8 SEC REPORT 143-47.

9 See SEC Memorandum of July 9, 1969, to the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
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ciary duty" standard 0 and the differing interpretations already suggested for this term, 1 it is by no means clear how the courts will apply
this new standard.

Ti

HISTORY OF MUTUAL FUNDS

Prior to the enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
open-end investment companies, 2 or mutual funds, were of little consequence in the securities industry, and many of those that did exist
suffered from managerial self-dealing. It was not unusual for a manager
to sell his own holdings to his fund at a handsome profit or to tap
the fund's assets for his personal business ventures. Needless to say,
these practices did not encourage investment in the funds. 18
In 1940 Congress sought to curb these gross abuses by enacting
the Investment Company Act, 14 which prohibited most sales and purchases of property between investment companies and their advisers.' 5
To protect further the interests of investors, and to add an element of
independent decision-making and bargaining power, the Act required
that at least forty percent of the fund's board of directors be composed
of men "unaffiliated" with the fund's investment adviser.16 The Act
Commerce of the House of Representatives, reprinted in Hearings on HR. 11995, S. 2224,
H.R. 13754, H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-33, pt. 1, at 138
(1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings]. This memo reports that the "fiduciary"
standard was substituted for the "reasonableness" standard by the Senate Banking Committee after it completed hearings in the spring of 1969. The change was made at the joint
recommendation of the SEC and mutual fund industry representatives. Id. See notes 7684 and accompanying text infra.
10 See note 85 infra.
11 See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
12 "Open-end" means that the fund continually offers shares for sale and will redeem
outstanding shares at their proportionate net asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1964).
13 In 1940, investment companies held assets of approximately $2.1 billion; of this
total, mutual funds accounted for only $450 million. SEC REPORT 2; see SEC, INVESTMENT
TRusTs AND INVTEsMENT COMPANIES pt. 3, at 22 (1940); Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A
Corporate Anomaly, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 1252 (1967); Werner, Protecting the Mutual
Fund Investor: The SEC Reports on the SEC, 68 CoLuar. L. REv. 1, 4 (1968).
For a more detailed discussion of mutual fund growth in the United States, see
WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE & COMMiERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-44 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT].
14 1967 House Hearings 27.
'6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964).
16 Id. § 80a-10. Although this is the general rule of the statute, there are exceptions.
For example, it does not apply to no-load funds (those which charge investors no commission when they purchase shares). Id. § 80a-10(d).
"Affiliated person" is defined in id. § 80a-2(a)(3).
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also provided that all compensation to be received by the fund's portfolio manager for his investment advice be set forth in a contract that
had to receive initial shareholder approval.17 Every year thereafter,
the contract had to be approved by either a majority of the shareholders or a majority of the disinterested directors.18
That the Act proved almost entirely successful in curbing the most
blatant abuses of the industry 9 is evidenced by the confidence it has
inspired among small investors. Within the last three decades, the
growth in the number of investors owning mutual funds and in the
net asset level of all mutual funds has been staggering. 20 Yet, along
with this phenomenal growth have come problems not clearly foreseen
by Congress in 1940.21
A.

A Unique Corporate Structure-Advisers Dominate Their Funds

Many problems, particularly the question of management compensation, can be traced directly to the unique corporate structure of
mutual funds, with its built-in conflicts of interest. 22 Almost all major
17

Id. § 80a-15(a).

18 Id. § 80a-15(a)(2).
19 SEC REPORT 1.
20 By 1967, the SEC reported that mutual fund assets had grown from $450 million

in 1940 to almost $45 billion. The number of shareholder accounts had grown from 300,000
to 7.7 million. Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 125 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings]. As of
December 31, 1969, the approximate net assets of the 100 largest mutual funds totalled
over $44 billion. MooDY's BANK & FINANCE MANUAL a53 (1970).
21 Congress did, in 1940, anticipate the possibility of growth in the industry and provided for this contingency as follows:
The Commission [SEC] is authorized, at such times as it deems that any substantial further increase in size of investment companies creates any problem
involving the protection of investors or the public interest, to make a study and
investigation of the effects of size on the investment policy of investment companies and on security markets, on concentration of control of wealth and industry, and on companies in which investment companies are interested, and from
time to time to report the results of its studies and investigations and its recommendations to the Congress.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1964).
Although Congress did provide for such reports, it is unlikely that it foresaw the very
massive growth that has in fact taken place and the problems that have accompanied that
growth. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 500 (1940).
22 See Statement of the SEC Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Oct. 10, 1967, 1967 House Hearings
26, 33-34; Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE LJ. 1258,
1263-65 (1961); Rottenberg, Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers,
7 HAtv. J. LEGis. 309, 312 (1970); Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company:
An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YA.x L.J. 137, 142 n-23 (1961).
The Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts, although
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mutual funds today :are externally managed, 21 which- means that the
firm or corporation that determines the composition of a mutual fund's
investment portfolio is a separate entity from the fund itself. The fund
is essentially a pool of capital and the adviser directs that capital into
24
investment opportunities.
Most of today's major mutual funds were created by their investment advisory firms, or "advisers," which set up the fund, arranged to
underwrite the continual sale of its shares to investors, and essentially
controlled, from the start, the fund's board of directors. 25 Hence, while
the fund and its adviser are theoretically two separate entities, with the
fund contracting out to the adviser for certain services, it is the adviser
28
that dominates the fund.
dealing primarily with the problems of Canada's mutual fund industry, gives an excellent
analysis of this problem:
In most industrial companies, a considerable portion of the reward to the senior
managers is derived from their direct interest in the enterprise.... In the mutual
fund situation, on the other hand, it is less frequent for managers to look to the
success of the mutual fund to generate their compensation ..
. The principal

reward of the senior managers is derived from management fees or sales charges,
and while these may be affected by the performance of the mutual fund the connection is less direct than is true with an industrial company manager who benefits directly from an increase in the value of his company's shares. This might be
expected to increase the susceptibility to conflicts of interest of the mutual fund
manager.
REPORT OF THE CANADIAN CoararrE ON MUTUAL FUNDS AND INVESTMENT CONTRACrS 274

(1969)..
23 "This 'externalization of management' is the most striking feature of the industry's organizational pattern." SEC REPORT 45. In explaining this characteristic further,
the Report said:
The practice of buying investment advice and management from an external adviser is one of long standing and was firmly imbedded in the industry at the time
that the [Investment Company] act was under consideration. The Act permitted
it to continue....
S.. [E]xternal management remains predominant even in the case of the
largest funds whose resources are clearly large enough to permit them to establish
efficient, well-staffed and well-remunerated advisory departments of their own.
Id. at 49-50.
Massachusetts Investors Trust has recently shifted from internal to external management. Compare MOODY'S BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1151 (1969), with MOODY'S BANK &

FINANCE MANUAL 1009 (1970). With net assets of over $2 billion, Massachusetts Investors

Trust is the nation's fourth largest mutual fund (id. at a53), and its shift to external
management indicates that there has been no lessening of the externalization pattern.
24 Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 826 U.S.
795 (1946); Note, The Use of Brokerage Commissions To Promote Mutual Fund Sales:
Time To Give Up the "Give-Up," 68 CoLum. L. REV. 334 (1968).
25 The investment adviser usually is well represented on the fund's board of
directors and maintains effective control over the fund. With respect to the fixing
of investment advisory or management fees, this situation creates an obvious conflict of interest between fund managers who control the fund, on the one hand,
and the shareholders of the investment company, on the other.
1967 Senate Hearings 10 (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen).
26 At the time of the Wharton study (1958-62), for example, the Wharton Report
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The Investment Company Act makes this dual corporate structure
attractive to investment advisers wishing to set up funds because -it
enables them to reap large entrepreneurial rewards. Unlike other
corporations, an investment company cannot issue stock options to its
organizers to enable them to purchase shares at low cost once the fund
has appreciated in value. Shares can only be sold at prices proportionate
to the net asset level of the fund at any given time.27 On the other hand,
this limit does not apply to sales of shares of the investment advisory
corporation. As the fund appreciates in value, the management fees increase as well, so that by virtue of its special relationship to the fund
the advisory organization becomes a valuable commodity itself. Those
with a proprietary interest in the advisory corporation can thereby
28
achieve substantial profits.

When it comes time for the fund to negotiate with its investment
adviser to determine the price it must pay for various portfolio services,
it becomes difficult to characterize the resulting rate schedule as an
arm's-length transaction. Considering the dominant role the adviser
plays in the fund's management, 29 it is hard to see how effective bargaining can take place.
Although the Act provides for certain checks on fund management
in dealing with the adviser, these safeguards have not been effective in
controlling advisory compensation.3" The Act requires initial shareholder approval of an investment advisory contract and reapproval
every year thereafter by fund shareholders or a majority of disinterested directors, 31 but shareholder rejection is highly unlikely. 2 Instead, such contracts are often ratified by vast majorities of shareholders.3 3 Under these circumstances, advisers have been under little
found that 89% of the funds it studied, or 94A% of all mutual fund assets, were under
the control of advisory groups with no substantial ownership interest in the fund itself.
The Wharton group attributed this high incidence of adviser domination to the unusually
wide diffusion of ownership of mutual fund shares, the passivity of most fund shareholders,
and control of the proxy machinery from the beginning by the adviser that promoted the
fund. WHARTON REPORT 64.

27 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1964). See also Note, Management Compensation: The SEC
Mutual Funds Report, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 66, 67-68 (1967).
28 See Note, supra note 27, at 68. The SEC Report noted that "[t]he securities of about
20 fund advisers are now publicly held." SEC REPORT 46. See generally WSRTON REPORT
452-62.
29 Notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
30 SEC RrEORT 12.
31 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964).
32 As the SEC points out, shareholders have little choice when voting on advisory
contracts. The adviser's dominance and control in running the fund are such that rejection
of the contract would leave the fund without management. SEC REPORT 129.
33 Wymeersch, Some Aspects of Management Fees of Mutual Funds, 17 U. BumrAro
L. REv. 747, 753-55 (1968); Note, supra note 22, at 148 n.50.
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pressure to bargain for their rates, 34 while dissatisfied shareholders have
taken to the courts to seek redress.
B. Shareholder Derivative Actions To Lower Advisory Fees-Only
Limited Success
The case of Saxe v. Brady35 established a foundation for judicial
treatment of shareholder suits alleging excessive management fees under previously existing law. The difficult burdens placed on plaintiffs
under the Saxe ruling, uniformly adhered to by both state and federal
courts,38 provided a major impetus for enactment of the new legisla37
tion.
In Saxe, plaintiff shareholders in a mutual fund sought to hold the
fund's directors, adviser, and principal underwriter liable for allegedly
"wasteful" fees paid to the adviser amounting to one-half percent of net
assets, a rate not uncommon in the industry at that time. The advisory
contract had been approved and reapproved almost unanimously by the
shareholders. 38 Finding that the shareholders were properly informed
of all material facts on both occasions, the court held that the advisory
fee level must be tested by legal standards applicable to shareholder
ratification cases:
When the stockholders ratify a transaction, the interested parties are relieved of the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. The burden then falls on the objecting stockholders to
convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for the value which was given.3 9
34 The costs of management services to mutual funds are unaffected by the

pricing process prevailing in most other areas of the economy outside the public
utility field, where prices of goods and charges for services are normally determined at arm's length and by the forces of competition.
1967 Senate Hearings 10 (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen).
35 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962). The case of Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39
Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961), decided one year before Saxe, presaged the Saxe
holding, but its discussion of the applicable rules was somewhat more limited, and it did
not confront a rate as high as the flat 0.5% fee charged in Saxe. Hence, Saxe is considered
the leading case.
36 See Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (indicating that
only three major cases-Saxe, Meiselman, and Acampora-have been fully litigated in this
area); settlements cited in note 57 infra which have all impliedly adopted the Saxe
rationale; Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 549 (D. Colo. 1963). See also 1967
Senate Hearings21; Wymeersch, supra note 33, at 783-87.
37 1969 House Hearings 188.

38 See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
39 40 Del. Ch. at 486, 184 A.2d at 610 (emphasis added). This statement, together with
other statements in Saxe, have been variously referred to as the "business judgment;'
"waste," "shocking," and "unconscionable" standards. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp.
527, 548 (D. Colo. 1963).
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Recognizing that a showing of actual waste of corporate assets would
vitiate the effect of shareholder ratification, the court held that plaintiffs
must show the fees were so out of proportion to the value of services
rendered as to be "unconscionable." 40
By requiring the application of a waste standard and by placing
the burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish the waste, Saxe has made
recovery in such derivative actions unlikely.41 So long as the rate structure of the industry and the specific approval of fund shareholders were
to be determinative factors 42 in assessing the existence of legally excessive fees, it is hard to imagine how a plaintiff could prevail. 43
Acampora v. Birkland,44 decided in a federal court only one year
after Saxe, adopted the Saxe rationale without criticism. Plaintiffs contended that the one-half percent fee was excessive in view of the substantially fewer services offered to the fund by its management adviser
than were offered by other advisers to their funds for the same fees.
Initially, the court noted that fees paid in excess of the industry average
were not necessarily legally excessive under the Saxe ruling.45 Unable
to find that the services rendered were in fact substantially less than
those offered by other advisers to their funds, the court held that plaintiffs had not shown the fees charged were "unconscionable" or "shocking" despite the judge's own belief that the rate "seemed high. 4 6
40 40 Del. Ch. at 487, 184 A.2d at 610. Among the factors that the court considered
important in holding against plaintiffs' complaint were: (1) that the flat 0.5% rate was not
uncommon in the industry, and that some funds paid in excess of that rate; and (2) that
an overwhelming majority of fund shareholders ratified the advisory contract. Id. at 489,
184 A.2d at 611-12.
41 SEC REPoar 141; see Horenstein v. Waddel & Reed, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE'. 92,678 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1970) (the likelihood of success
in such actions "is not great'); Goodman v. Von Der Heyde, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SFC. L. REP. 92,541, at 98,493 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (the likelihood of success in such
actions is so poor that the claim might better be addressed to Congress than to the courts).

42 See note 40 supra.

43 In fact, there has never been a successful suit. Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 804,
305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Considering the two factors deemed important by the court in Saxe
(note 40 supra), success is impossible for two reasons: (1) overwhelming shareholder ratification is commonplace in the industry (note 33 and accompanying text supra); and (2)
the general rate structure of the industry has remained fairly constant over time. As of
June 30, 1968, 68 of the 87 funds with net assets over $100 million had effective management fees of 0A% or over, 59 with fees of 0.45% or more, and 46 with fees of 0.5% or more.
Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate Hearings]. Compare these
rates with the 0.5% or lower rate referred to in Saxe as not uncommon 10 years earlier.
40 Del. Ch. at 489, 184 A.2d at 611.
44 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
45 Id. at 548.

46 Id. at 549.
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Another approach to shareholder derivative actions alleging excessive fees was suggested by a district court holding in Brown v. Bullock 47 that private rights of action could be implied throughout the
Investment Company Act and specifically under section 86.48 In affirming the district court,49 however, the Second Circuit found private rights
of action only in sections 15(a) to (b) and 37,50 while it remained silent
regarding section 36. 51 It remains highly questionable whether a private right existed, and if so, whether it would have made a significant
difference for shareholders bringing derivative actions.8 2 Under the
new law, this question has of course become moot.
Saxe has loomed over litigation in this area so as to pose a serious
barrier to shareholder challenges of advisory fees.5 3 The litigation, however, has not been quite as fruitless to shareholders as Saxe would indicate. Despite the poor odds for success, many shareholders have
47 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
48 Id. at 245-46. See Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20
RtrrcMs L. REv. 181 (1966); Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation-New Frontiers
for the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUm. L. Rnv. 73 (1962).
Section 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964), as it existed prior to December 14, 1970, provided:
The Commission [SEC] is authorized to bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States ... alleging that a person serving or acting in one or
more of the following capacities has been guilty ... of gross misconduct or gross
abuse of trust in respect of any registered investment company for which such
person so serves or acts:
(1) as officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser,
or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end
company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If the Commission's allegations of such gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
are established, the court shall enjoin such person from acting in such capacity or
capacities either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall
deem appropriate.
49 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
IO Id. at 420.
51 See Werner, supra note 13, at 22 n.139.
82 It was just this hope-that actions under § 36 would enable federal courts to
fashion a federal common law fiduciary duty more favorable to shareholders than the Saxe
test-that encouraged advocates of an implied right of action. See Eisenberg & Lehr, supra
note 48, at 224-25. The existence of such a private right of action has been debated.
Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir. 1963). By 1966, the SEC
dearly abandoned hope of remedying defects in the Act by judicial construction. SEC
REor 143. At least one author has concluded that no private right of action could be
said to exist under § 36 of the Act. Wymeersch, supra note 33, at 787. Recently, Moses v.
Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 55 (D. Mass. 1970), indicated a judicial reluctance to derive a
common law of fiduciary duties under the previously existing § 36 of the Act. Contra, eg.,
Tauzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Del. 1970); SEC v. Quing N. Wong, 42 F.R.D.
599, 601 (D.P.R. 1967).
53 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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brought actions anyway.u4 The result has been a number of court-approved settlements providing for various forms of advisory fee reductions. 5
Most settlements have been modest from the point of view of all
parties concerned. 6 The principal reason the courts have felt compelled to approve these settlements has been the apparent unlikelihood
of success by plaintiffs should they proceed to a final judicial determination on the merits. 57 Advisers have been willing to settle these actions
largely because of the dicta of Saxe indicating that at some point rates
may be held excessive; 5 8 in view of the vast sums involved, their willingness is quite understandable.5 9 While settlements and threats of share54 See note 5 supra.
55 A listing of these is found in SEC REPoRT 154.
56 1967 Senate Hearings 139 (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen):

[Tjhe median advisory fee paid by the 59 externally managed funds with net
assets of $100 million or more was still 0.48 percent after these settlements. Thus,
although some progress has been made in a few individual cases, principally involving the very largest funds, the effect on the overall problem has not been
significant.
57 Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Horenstein v. Waddel
& Reed, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,678 (S.D.N.Y. May 26,
1970); Goodman v. Von Der Heyde, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), where
the court of appeals upheld a district court finding that the proposed settlement was
"so inadequate and, therefore, so unfair that it should not receive judicial approval."
Id. at 771.
58 In Saxe, the court warned that "it is clear both in law and in fact that compensation payments may grow so large that they are unconscionable." 40 Del. Ch. at 487, 184

A.2d at 610. More specifically:
Based on the 1959 and 1960 figures the profits are certainly approaching the point
where they are outstripping any reasonable relationship to expenses and effort
even in a legal sense. . . . T]he business community might reasonably expect
that at some point those representing the fund would see that the management
fee was adjusted to reflect the diminution in the cost factor.
Id. at 498, 184 A.2d at 616-17. See Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 567, 170 A2d
720, 722 (Ch. 1961) ("[r]ecognizing that there must be some limitation on the payment
to persons discharging such [advisory] services .... ').
The SEC found Saxe was a primary factor in inducing fund managers to agree to
settlements. SEC REPORT 138.
59 Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a recent action terminated
by a court-approved settlement, is illustrative of the above generalizations. The plaintiff's
main complaint was that the management fee paid by Dreyfus Fund to its adviser, the
Dreyfus Corporation, was excessive in view of the fund's size. Although Dreyfus is an
industry giant, its adviser still charged it a flat fee of 0.5% of net assets with no scaledown, the highest fee of any fund its size. The settlement did not provide for a reduction
in the fee rate, but required Dreyfus Corporation to offset against the fee any profits it
received from certain fund-related activities. In view of the poor chances for plaintiff's
success on the merits, the court felt compelled to approve the settlement even though it
found that the maximum guaranteed reduction under the settlement would be from an
effective rate of 0.5% to an effective rate of 0A92% of net assets. Similar considerations
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holder suits have encouraged a general downward trend with respect to
industry fees, 60 these reductions have not been significant. 61
II
HISTORY OF THE NEW LEGISLATION

A. The Wharton and SEC Reports-Forerunnersof the New Legislation
In 1962 the Wharton Report62 concluded that the fundamental
problems in the industry involved the potential conflicts of interest between fund management and fund shareholders, and the possible absence of arm's-length bargaining between funds and their management
advisers. More specifically, the Report noted that there were distinct
economies of scale in managing larger investment portfolios, yet these
economies were not being reflected in reduced management fees. This
was particularly disturbing, the Report said, in view of significantly
lower rates charged by the fund advisers to manage sizeable sums of
money for private individuals. 4
The Wharton Report's conclusions prompted further study by the
SEC, which culminated in a Commission report to Congress in 1966.65
While noting some recent reductions in advisory fees under the pressures generated by the Wharton Report and pending stockholder litigation, the SEC Report nevertheless found the level of fees highly
questionable in view of the costs to advisers in providing portfolio
militated in favor of court approval of minimal settlements in several other cases. See
Horenstein v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,678 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1970); Goodman v. Von Der Heyde, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fmz. SFc. L. REP.
92,541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund,
92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEC. L. RE.
60 See 1969 Senate Hearings 8-9; note 43 supra.

61 In 1967, SEC Chairman Cohen said:
The median advisory fee paid by the 59 externally managed mutual funds
with net assets of $100 million or more in fiscal years ending in 1966 was still
0A8 percent, down only 0.02 percent from the traditional 0.50 percent rate.
1967 Senate Hearings 14. See accompanying table, id. at 15.

SEC Commissioner Owens made a similar statement to a Senate committee in 1969.
1969 Senate Hearings 8.

62 In 1958 the SEC authorized the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania to make a study of the mutual
fund industry; in 1962 the report was submitted to Congress. WHARTON REPORT 1.
63 Id. at x.
64 Id. at 28-29.
,5 SEC REPORT.
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services.6 6

management
The SEC concluded that new legislation was
required to protect investors by ensuring the fairness of advisory compensation. 67 Specifically, it recommended amendment of the Act to
provide expressly that advisory compensation be reasonable, 68 regardless
of shareholder or directorial approval of advisory contracts. 69 The SEC
also recommended that both the Commission and shareholders be given
a right of action under the Act to enforce the reasonableness standard. 70
Going beyond the recommendation of the "reasonableness" test,
the SEC offered specific factors for courts to consider in determining
reasonableness: 71 (1) the cost of comparable services to other funds;
(2) the cost of advisory services to funds that have internalized management; 72 (3) the cost of services, such as pension and profit-sharing plans,
to non-fund clients of advisers; 73 (4) the nature and extent of services
provided; (5) the past performance of the fund and how beneficial past
services to the fund have been; and (6) -other compensation the adviser
may receive from its relation to the fund.7 4 The Commission was particularly anxious to make clear that director or shareholder approval
should not affect the application of this reasonableness standard. Specifically, it did not want such approval to result in the application of
judicial tests associated with shareholder ratification cases. 75
00 Id. at 95-125.
In summary, the SEC Report found that management fees did not reflect the substantial economies of scale inherent in portfolio management; that advisers charged funds
substantially higher prices for investment services than other financial institutions charged
their clients; and that the then-existing limits on advisory compensation had proven
inadequate. Id. at 10-13.
67 Id. at 143-47.
68 Id. at 144.
69 Id.

70 Id. at 146.
71 Id. at 144-45.
72 The Wharton study found that the cost to internally managed funds of maintaining advisory apparatus was substantially smaller than the fees paid by externally managed
funds to their advisers. WHARTON REPORT 485.
73 The Wharton study was particularly disturbed by the disparity between the fees
advisers charged to their other, non-fund, clients and the fees they charged the funds:
[The] evidence suggests that the lower rates charged other clients have little to
do with difference in expenses, which on a priori grounds would seem to favor
relatively low and significantly declining rates for open-end companies with in-

creases in asset size.
Id. at 493.
74 This would include profits derived by advisers that maintain subsidiaries to handle
underwriting of fund shares and fund-related brokerage transactions. See generally id.
at 471-75, which details relationships existing among advisers, underwriters, and brokers.
75 SEC REPORT 145-46. The Saxe holding provided that the applicable standards
were those of shareholder ratification cases. Hence it applied a "waste," or "business
judgment" test to the fee structure. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra. The
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B. Legislative Debate and Action
The standard of "reasonableness" recommended by the SEC was
initially incorporated in bills submitted in the House and Senate in
1967.76 The industry, however, was vehemently opposed to the legislation's "reasonableness" test 77 and succeeded in blocking passage of the
bill at that time.78 Nevertheless, the bill was introduced again in
1969; 71 the Senate Banking Committee again held hearings and elicited
much the same polarized response to the reasonableness standard.80
While these hearings were in progress, negotiations on the substance of the bill continued between the industry and the SEC. Perhaps
aware of the increasing likelihood that some legislation would be
adopted, the Investment Company Institute began to concentrate its
criticism on the details of the bill itself.81 In May 1969, the SEC and
industry representatives reached a compromise and submitted their
proposal to the House committee.8 2 In place of the standard of reasonableness, both parties agreed that the adviser should have a fiduciary
duty to its fund with regard to the level of compensation the adviser
SEC, in proposing its reasonableness test, wanted to make clear that "reasonable" would
not be converted to "waste" by the operation of shareholder ratification. SEC RPORT

145-46.
76 H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)

(1967).
In describing the proposed standard, Manuel Cohen, the SEC Chairman at that time,
said: "We ask only that by specific language in the act Congress make explicit the authority
of the courts to determine as a matter of Federal law whether, in a particular situation,
the fund's advisory fee is reasonable." 1967 Senate Hearings 22. In specifying the factors
relevant to a determination of reasonableness, Chairman Cohen said:

The specific factors listed are the extent to which the fees reflect a sharing
of the economies of size, the nature, extent and quality of the services provided
-and I emphasize the quality-and the value of all other benefits received.
The investment adviser and the directors of the investment company [would]
have a fiduciary responsibility to that corporation and all of its shareholders to
assure that the company is not subject to an unreasonable fee.
Id. at 22-23.
77 The industry contended fees were already reasonable, the legislation would merely
encourage "strike" suits, and the SEC would in effect be given the power to regulate a
competitive industry. 1967 Senate Hearings 191-92, 201. Members of the industry rejected
all the relevant conclusions of the Wharton and SEC Reports, maintaining that their
industry was truly competitive vis-bL-vis management fees, that there was in fact real
arm's.length bargaining for the fees between unaffiliated directors and advisers, and that
fees had significantly dropped in recent years. Id. at 193, 197.
78 A similar bill passed the Senate in 1968 but died in the House. See Rottenberg,
supra note 22, at 333-37.
79 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
So 1969 Senate Hearings.
81 See, e.g., id. at 88-92.
82 1969 House Hearings 138.
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receives. 83 They did not agree, however, on the definition of fiduciary
84
duty.
III
THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD

To say that a fiduciary relationship exists between the adviser and
its mutual fund does not establish a clear-cut answer to litigation;
rather, it merely opens the door to broad judicial inquiry.8 5 There are
numerous relationships that have been characterized as fiduciary in
nature to which the duties of an adviser under the new legislation
might be analogized. Among the most widely recognized fiduciary relationships are those between a trustee and his cestui, between an attorney
and his client, and between a director and his corporation.8 6
The standards applicable to each of these fiduciary relationships
may differ.8 7 For example, the duties of a corporate director may vary
83 S.2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969).
84 Of particular relevance to any discussion of fiduciary duty in the advisory fee
context is the different characterization of the compromise offered by both parties to the
discussions. An SEC memorandum to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce said:
The Commission views this [standard] as a significant and meaningful improvement over the existing law and at least as helpful as the reasonableness
standard of S. 34.
The Commission therefore supports these provisions as a satisfactory and
even more effective method than its original proposal to test the reasonableness
of mutual fund management fees.
1969 House Hearings 138-39 (emphasis added). In contrast to the SEC's characterization
of the compromise, Senator Brooke, who is somewhat less critical of the industry, remarked:
This, in my judgment, represents a significant improvement over last year's
bill in that unconscionable management fee contracts can be challenged; however,
the judiciary does not assume the role of a "rate fixer" [as it would under the
reasonableness standard].
115 CoNG. REc. 13,699 (1969) (emphasis added).
85 In his often-quoted opinion in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1948), Justice
Frankfurter said:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?
In what respects has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?
Id. at 85-86.
86 In re Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 36 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (debtor
who held property as trustee for his creditors thereby occupied a fiduciary relationship
to them); Finn v. Monk, 403 Ill. 167, 181, 85 N.E.2d 701, 708 (1949); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y.
65 (1880); cases cited in note 96 infra. See also H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 235 (2d ed. 1970); Wymeersch, supra
note 33, at 756.
87 "Some fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense [i.e., involve more
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significantly from those of a trustee."" Corporate directors require more
freedom of action and must, on occasion, be permitted to have dealings
with their corporations. The concept of fiduciary obligation, however,
tends to uphold such transactions only after rigorous judicial scrutiny.8 9
A. The Adviser's Fiduciary Obligation as Analogous to ,Fiduciary
Obligations in the CorporateContext

For a variety of reasons, the investment adviser's obligations seem
most closely allied to the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors.

Most obviously, the adviser itself is often the dominant influence upon
the fund's board of directors and occupies several of its seats.90 In this
sense, the adviser owes duties to the corporation and its shareholders
similar to those owed by any director.91 Secondly, if the adviser is
rigorous standards of conduct] than others." Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 539, 541 (1949). One authority on corporations has stated:
While analogies to fiduciary principles applied to trustees, partners, joint
venturers, agents, and others in fiduciary positions may be helpful, such principles
are not always strictly applicable to the director, officer, and controlling shareholder [of a corporation].
H. HENN, supra note 86, § 235, at 458. See H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS

§ 66 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, supra note 86, § 235, at 458 n.3.
88 [D]irectors occupy a fiduciary relation to the corporation, and to its creditors
and stockholders. This relation is analogous to that of agent to principal, and
trustee to cestui que trust, but it is not of so intimate and confidential a character as either of these.
Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257, 273 (8th Cir. 1904). See note 87 supra.
89 See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 514 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (courts should not impose impractical obligations on fiduciaries); H. HENN, supra note 86, § 235, at 458 (directors are not subject to the strictest
rules applicable to fiduciaries such as trustees, given the different business context and
the necessities of corporate operation); note 97 infra. See also Wyman v. Bowman, 127
F. 257, 273 (8th Cir. 1904), for a lengthy discussion of the reasons why corporate fiduciaries
are not subject to as strict standards as other kinds of fiduciaries; H. BALLANrINE, supra
note 87, at § 72; Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors,
61 HARv. L. REv. 335, 335-36 (1948).
90 See notes 25-26 supra.
91 Since the enactment of the Investment Company Act, the adviser in this sense has
been held to occupy a fiduciary relationship to the fund. SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc.,
254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958); Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC,
151 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). It is important to note
that the problem confronted by shareholders under the old law was not the total absence
of fiduciary duties, but the Saxe decision to treat litigation in this area as involving ratification, which called for the application of a very loose "waste" standard. See notes 39, 41,
43 and accompanying text supra.

With respect to the duties of a,director generally, see H. HENN, supra note 86, at
§3 235-42.
Regarding this characterization of the adviser as a director of the mutual fund
because some of the persons who control the adviser sit on the board of directors of
the mutual fund, consider Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
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viewed as a director, the advisory contract may be viewed both as a
contract between a corporation and one of its directors-and as a contract
between two corporations with common directors (since the "adviser"
sits on the advisory firm's board of directors as well as the fund's board).
Moreover, the advisory contract may be viewed as a form of management compensation, thus bringing to bear principles that are applicable
when directors and officers of a corporation fix their own compensation.92 Although the anomalous structure of the mutual fund 93 requires
that these characterizations be qualified,9 4 the concept of the corporate
fiduciary does serve to indicate the applicable fiduciary standards.
B.

The Meaning of FiduciaryDuties in the Corporate Context

Under normal circumstances, when directors act within their authority, in good faith, and without any conflicts of interest, courts will
not overturn challenged directorial actions unless the actions can be
shown to amount to a waste of corporate assets.9 5 In considering transactions in which corporate fiduciaries have conflicts of interest, however,
the modern view has been to uphold such transactions only if they are
determined to be fair.9 6 In determining the fairness of such transaccert. denied, 896 U.S. 1086 (1970). There, the Second Circuit held that for purposes of
liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964),
Martin Marietta Corporation was a "director" of Sperry Rand Corporation because
Martin's president and chief executive sat as Martin's representative on Sperry's board
of directors.
92 See H. HENN, supra note 86, at §§ 243-44.
93 See notes 22-34 and accompanying text supra.
94 The mutual fund is a corporation in which those with no ownership whatsoever
control the operation of the organization. The fund cannot be viewed as a subsidiary to
the adviser because the adviser has no proprietary interest in the fund. The mutual fund
is a corporation whose shareholders have chosen to submit to the domination of another
business entity-the adviser. See, e.g., the discussion of whether the fund is really a
separate entity at all or merely a vehicle whereby money is managed for a fee, in RIrorT
OF THE CANADIAN CoMMrrTE ON MUTUAL FuND AND INvEsrmENT CoNTRAcrs 104-05 (1969).
95 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 884 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
811 U.S. 695 (1940); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968);
Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128, 251 N.W. 421 (1933); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal
Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922); see H. HENN, supra note 86, § 242, at
482 n.4.
96 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
254 U.S. 590 (1921); Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Murphy v.
Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Irving BankColumbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 292 F. 815 (1st Cir. 1923); Ransome Concrete Mach. Co.
v. Moody, 282 F. 29 (2d Cir. 1922); Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257 (8th Cir. 1904); Colorado
Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961);
Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918); Wiberg v.
Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co., 360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); see H. BAUANTiNg,
supra note 87, at §§ 67-68; H. HENN, supra note 86, at § 288.
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tions, courts apply the most rigid judicial scrutiny."T This is true
whether the conflict involves a director sitting on the boards of corporations that have dealings with each other or a director having dealings
with his own corporation.9 8 It is also true when the conflict involves
directors fixing their own compensation.9 9
In determining the fairness of a transaction, the Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain."10 0 If the court does not find the transaction "inherently
fair," 110 ' it may set aside the transaction. 02 There must be a "reasonable
proportion between benefits and burdens";' 10 3 the corporation must receive full value for its expense; 04 and courts have found it important
to determine whether there was full disclosure and whether the transaction was at, below, or above market price.105
Since fairness is, of necessity, a difficult term to define precisely,
and, a fortiori, to prove, litigation in this areas has been as concerned
with determining which party has the burden of proof as with defining
fairness. It has generally been held that where the fairness of transactions involving conflicts of interest is questioned, the burden is upon
the defendant directors to show fairness. 0 6
97 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463, 164 N.E. 545, 546

(1928).
98 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 II. 2d 268, 282, 166 N.E.2d 793, 801
(1960). H. HFNN, supra note 86, § 238, at 465 & n.l, indicates the rules may be slightly
stricter for transactions between a corporation and one of its directors than between two
corporations with common directors.
99 Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Ransome Concrete Mach. Co.
v. Moody, 282 F. 29 (2d Cir. 1922).
100 Pepper v. Litton, 308 US. 295, 306-07 (1939) (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 306.

See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588 (1875) (stating that a contract
negotiated by directors with conflicting loyalties may be set aside "on slight grounds');
H. HENN, supra note 86, at § 238.
103 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 490, 121 N.E. 378, 380
(1918).
104 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921).
105 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 IlM.2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d 793, 801-02
(1960).
106 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (contract between a director and his
corporation); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) (contract
between two corporations with common directors); Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257 (8th
Cir. 1904); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Baker v. Helner Realty Co.,
265 Mich. 625, 251 N.W. 793 (1933); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y.
483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918). But see Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 412,
8 N.E2d 895, 905 (1937). See also H. BALLANrmE, supra note 87, at § 70; HL Huu, supra
note 86, at § 238.
102
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Under certain circumstances, however, this burden may be altered
or may shift back to the plaintiff. For example, it has been held that
majority shareholder approval, or ratification, of directorial actions will
place the burden on the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of the transaction. 07 But for ratification to have this effect, it must be meaningful
ratification, made with full knowledge of all circumstances. 08
C. Application of Directorial Fiduciary Standards to Mutual Fund
Advisers-Burden of Proof and Determinants of Fairness
It is clear that the mutual fund cases will no longer be treated as
ratification cases, but rather as fiduciary duty cases in which the adviserdirector has conflicts of interest. 10 9 As such, they would normally be
treated as situations where the adviser-defendant has the burden of
proving the fairness of the transaction under common law principles. 110
Section 36(b)(1) appears, however, to deviate from the corporate director cases by placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving a breach of
fiduciary duty."' Arguably, this standard requires the plaintiff to dem107 Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Olson Bros. v. Englehart,
42 Del. Ch. 348, 211 A.2d 610 (Ch. 1965); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602
(Ch. 1962) (this, of course, was the case in which shareholder ratification of mutual fund
advisory fees was deemed to shift the burden to the plaintiff and require him to establish
"waste"; see text accompanying note 39 supra); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (Ch. 1952); United States Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N.J. Eq. 807,
54 A. 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903); see H. HENN, supra note 86, at § 194.
108 United Hotels Co. of America v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1945); First
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, 427 (8th Cir. 1938); Cahall
v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 319, 114 A. 224, 234 (Ch. 1921); Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 151-52, 154 A. 321, 322-23 (Ch. 1931) (court agreed to issue
injunction against directors seeking to obtain shareholder ratification of actions then
under challenge in the courts); see H. BALLANTINE, supra note 87, at § 71.
109 New § 36(b)(2) as set forth in note 4 supra; see 1969 House Hearings 177, 188.
It should be noted at this point that the Saxe court did not have to treat that litigation
as a case of shareholder ratification. Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968), held
that where those interested in a transaction control a majority of shares, there can be no
shareholder ratification, at least to the extent that it shifts the burden of proof to the
party attacking the transaction. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483,
491-92, 121 N.E. 378, 380-81 (1918), held that a dominant corporate officer with conflicting
interests could not abstain from voting and then set up ratification by his board of
directors as a defense to unfairness; the court said his refusal to vote does not "nullify
...
an influence and predominance exerted without a vote." See also Wymeersch, supra
note 33, at 786; note 108 and accompanying text supra. Thus, rather than finding shareholder approval controlling, Saxe could have found the ratification meaningless in view
of the adviser's control of the proxy mechanism and the history of a high incidence of
shareholder ratification in the industry. United Hotels Co. of America v. Mealey, 147 F.2d
816, 819 (2d Cir. 1945).
110 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
111 See note 4 supra.
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onstrate that the transaction is unfair by a clear preponderance of the
evidence, 112 but this view need not be accepted without qualification.
By applying traditional principles of statutory construction, the significance of the deviation can be clarified.
Where a statute alters rights and burdens recognized by the common
law, it is generally given a strict interpretation to avoid the change as.
serted; 113 yet, remedial statutes are also liberally construed to carry
out the purposes for which they were enacted. 114 It can be argued on two
grounds that the plaintiff should not have the full burden of proof.
First, the common law would place the burden on the defendant to
prove fairness, and the statute's terse language does not make clear that
it intends to completely shift the burden. 11 Second, the purpose of the
statute is to allow shareholders to obtain full judicial inquiry into advisory fees. Placing a full burden of proof on plaintiffs might well result
in a continuation of present shareholder difficulties in the courts. 116
A helpful approach to this dilemma has been offered by courts
in several jurisdictions. 117 They suggest that when shareholders challenge an action by a corporate fiduciary in which that fiduciary has
conflicts of interest, the shareholder must bring forward some evidence
that unfairness or irregularity was involved in the transaction; once
the shareholder has thereby established a prima facie case, the burden
of explanation shifts to the director to justify the fairness of the transaction.
In Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,118 minority shareholders alleged that a majority
shareholder had used his controlling position to depress the price of
Mayflower Hotel Corporation stock so that he could purchase additional shares at bargain prices. According to the complaint, the majority
shareholder then sold out his interest to Hilton Hotels Corporation,
112 SEC Commissioner Owens stated that the shareholder "must prove [a breach of

fiduciary duty] by a preponderance of the evidence as in any other lawsuit." 1969 Senate
Hearings 20.
§ 6201 (3d ed. 1943).
114 Id. § 5701.
115 Indeed, the House language requiring plaintiff to prove a breach of fiduciary
duty by "clear and convincing evidence," which might have eliminated any ambiguity in
the Act, was deleted in conference committee. See note I supra.
116 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
117 Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 73
F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hackley v. Oltz, 105 So. 2d
20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Sage v. Culver, 147 N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513 (1895); Baker v.
Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified & aff'd, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623
(Ist Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
118 73 F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
113 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSrucrION
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which used its dominant position to negotiate a favorable management
contract with Mayflower. In discussing plaintiff's burden in such cases,
the court stated that where an interlocking structure is shown to exist,
the plaintiff need show little else to make out a prima facie case and
shift the burden of proof." 9
In Baker v. Cohn,120 plaintiff owned forty percent of the stock of
a corporation. His relationship to the business became largely passive,
while defendants, majority stockholders, were directly involved in
operating the business. Evidence showed that defendants withdrew
forty-four percent of gross income during the years 1935-40 as salaries
and commissions, and that the ratio of salaries to net income during
those years ranged from eighty percent in 1937 to 102 percent in 1935.
The court held that this showing of unreasonable salaries was sufficient
2
to cast upon the defendants the burden of offering an explanation.' 1
Baker was relied upon most recently in Hackley v. Oltz,122 a case
with very similar facts. Plaintiffs in Hackley, forty percent stockholders,
alleged that the remaining three majority stockholders, who were also
the directors of the corporation, had authorized payment to themselves
of excessive bonuses and salaries from the corporation in complete disregard of actual services rendered. This allegation was based upon the
undisputed fact that bonuses were to be based on a percentage figure
making no reference to the specific services defendants had rendered.
In reversing a lower court dismissal of the action, the court stated:
It was alleged that the payments by the directors to themselves
were excessive and unwarranted by the services rendered . .. A
review of the evidence convinces us that the plaintiffs presented
119 id. at 724.
The district court then went on to hold that the prima fade case to be alleged must
demonstrate a grossly inequitable or fraudulent transaction, not one that is merely unfair.
Finding that the allegations were only of unfairness and of errors of judgment, the court
dismissed the complaint. Its decision on this point was reversed by the District'of Columbia
Circuit, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949), which held that all the shareholder must challenge
is the fairness and adequacy of consideration involved in the transaction.
120 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified & aff'd, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.YS.2d
623 (Ist Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
121 Id. at 166.
As support for its holding, the court cited Sage v. Culver, 147 N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513
(1895). In Sage the court stated:
When it can fairly be gathered from all the allegations of a complaint that
the officers and directors of a corporation have made use of relations of trust and
confidence in order to secure or promote some selfish interest, enough is then
averred to set a court of equity in motion and to require an answer from the
defendants in regard to the facts.
Id. at 247, 41 N.E. at 514.
122 105 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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suffident evidence to establish a prima facie case. At this point the
burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to the defendants.12 3

24
Given, then, the conflicting interests of the mutual fund adviser
25
it can be argued
and its dominance of the fund's board of directors,
that this kind of prima facie rule should apply. The showing of certain
facts indicating possible unfairness to the fund 2 6 should be sufficient to
shift the burden of explanation to the defendant-adviser, notwithstand-

ing section 36(b)(1) of the amended Act. Section 36(b)(1) merely places
the burden of proof on the plaintiff; if the defendant sufficiently justifies
his actions when confronted by the prima facie case so as to meet his
burden of coming forward with evidence, the burden of persuasion may,
then, still be said to rest with the plaintiff, thereby following the statutory language.
It can also be argued, however, that once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case of unfairness, the burden should shift permanently to the defendant to establish the fairness of the advisory contract by a preponderance of the evidence. This would not only serve
to effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute, but it would also be
the rule that least departs from the common law of fiduciary duties of
directors. Courts have been strict in considering transactions in which
corporate fiduciaries have conflicting interests, and have generally
placed a heavy burden of proof on the defendants.' 27 Such an interpretation of section 36(b)(l)-requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case and then shifting the burdens of producing evidence and of
persuasion permanently to the defendant-is not ruled out by the
128
legislative history of the Act.
Regardless of the burdens of production and persuasion in these
cases, it is necessary to consider what factors courts may deem relevant
to a determination of fairness under the new legislation. The statute
itself gives little guidance, except for indicating that the court may view
123
124

Id. at 23-24 (citing Baker).
See note 22 and accompanying text supra.

125 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
126 These facts are discussed in notes 136-41 and accompanying text infra.
127 See notes 97 & 106 and accompanying text supra.
128 The reason for the legislation was the inability of shareholders to obtain judicial
relief from present levels of management fees. SEC REPoRT 143; H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). The major difficulty
under prior law was the heavy burden of proof placed upon the plaintiff. See notes 41-43
and accompanying text supra. By adopting a prima fade rule that shifts both the burdens
of production and persuasion to the defendant, the courts will be furthering the remedial
purposes of the statute. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
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disinterested director or shareholder approval of advisory fees as it
deems "appropriate under the circumstances."' 29 There can be little
doubt that shareholder ratification will not be the controlling factor
it was under the Saxe doctrine. 13 0 Considering that mutual fund shareholders almost always ratify advisory contracts by vast majorities. 31 and
that the adviser controls the proxy machinery, 13 2 it is unlikely that
courts will give much weight to ratification as a determinant of fair.
ness 133

Looking, then, to generally accepted tests of fairness, it can be said
that the transaction must be "inherently fair," the fund must receive
full value for its expenses, and the transaction must carry the "earmarks" of an arm's-length bargain. 34 The court will look to all the
circumstances of the transaction to determine fairness. 13 Beyond this,
however, there is little direct guidance as to what specific factors should
be relevant to a determination of fairness. Thus, the new law's legislative history as well as the SEC statement should be consulted for
guidance as to possibly relevant determinants of fairness.
In its report, the Senate Banking Committee stated that "the best
industry practice will provide a guide" to the legality of challenged
advisory fees-i.e., if one adviser charges a higher fee than another
under comparable conditions of size and costs, the fee becomes questionable.136 The Committee also indicated that fees should reflect an

effort by advisers to share economies of scale in mutual fund manage137
ment with shareholders.
See § 36(b)(2), in note 4 supra.
S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1969), states that ratification is not
to be controlling, but is merely one factor to be considered in determining fairness. See
1969 House Hearings 188; note 109 supra.
131 Text accompanying note 33 supra.
132 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
133 Courts have generally refused to give effect to ratification when it is a mere
formality. Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Abelow v. Symonds, 40 Del. Ch.
462, 184 A.2d 173 (Ch. 1962); Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 104 A.2d
267 (Ch. 1954); see note 108 and accompanying text supra.
134 See text accompanying notes 100-01, 104 supra.
'35 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
136 S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969).
137 Id. The Committee was apparently motivated by the Wharton and SEC Reports'
findings of substantial economies of scale in portfolio management as funds increase in
size. See notes 64, 66 and accompanying text supra. Some funds have instituted scale-downs
whereby the percentage fee decreases gradually as fund assets increase. See SEC REoRT
138 n.169. Apparently, this would constitute the "best industry practice" at the present
time. See S. RaP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969). It is interesting to ponder the fate
of Dreyfus Corporation, one of the largest advisers in the mutual fund field, which has a
flat 0.5% rate and thus far has not instituted a scale-down. See note 59 supra. Perhaps
Dreyfus Corporation has breached its fiduciary duty to the Dreyfus Fund under the new
standard.
129
130
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An earlier version of the recently enacted legislation 8s actually included a listing of determinants of the "reasonableness" of advisory fees.
Although these factors were subsequently deleted from the bill and
the new standard is one of fiduciary duty rather than reasonableness,
this listing sheds some light on legislative intent in the absence of a
139
more concrete source of guidance:
(A) The nature and extent of the services to be provided...
(B) The quality of the services theretofore rendered... ;
(C) The extent to which the compensation... takes into account
economies attributable to the growth and size of such investment company ....giving due consideration to the extent to
which such economies are reflected in the charges made...
for investment advisory services ... to investment companies
having no investment adviser [i.e., internally managed], other
clients of investment advisers and other financial institutions,
but with due allowance for any relevant differences in the nature and extent of the services provided;
(D) The value of all benefits, in addition to compensation provided for in such contract, directly or indirectly received or
receivable by the person undertaking to serve . . . as investment adviser by reason of his relationship to such investment
company;
(E) Such other factors as are appropriate and material. 140
Not only do these factors closely resemble those suggested by the Senate
Banking Committee, but they also closely parallel the determinants of
fairness set forth in the SEC Report. 41 Considering the similarity
among all these sources, they cannot be lightly rejected as relevant only
to reasonableness and not to fairness.
In view of these sources and what they indicate about legislative
intent, it can be argued that a showing of one of the following facts
by plaintiffs will shift the burden of explanation (and possibly of persuasion) to the defendant: (1) the services provided to the fund are
138 S. 1659, 90th Cong., Ist Seass. § 8(d) (1967). See note 76 supra.
139 One writer has stated that the removal by Congress of this listing was an effort

to avoid binding the courts to any specific test of reasonableness, rather than an expression
that these factors were irrelevant to reasonableness. Rottenberg, supra note 22, at 335
& n.122.
140 Investment Company Act, proposed § 15(d)(2), S.1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)
(1967).
141 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra, for the SEC Report's recommended
determinants of reasonableness. See also text accompanying note 76 supra. Considering
the SEC's statement that the fiduciary standard is an "even more effective method than its
original proposal to test the reasonableness of mutual fund management fees," it is
certainly arguable that these factors are equally relevant to either reasonableness or fairness
(fairness being the test of breaches of fiduciary duty). See note 84 supra.
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considerably fewer than those provided at a similar price for similar
size funds by their advisers; (2) the performance of a fund. has been
substantially poorer than other similar sized funds, yet it continues to
pay the same or higher fees; (3) other funds of comparable size pay
significantly lower fees; (4) considering the total level of compensation
of the adviser, the adviser's profits are in excess of profits received by
comparable fund advisers; (5) the adviser charges non-fund clients substantially lower rates; (6) other financial institutions charge considerably
lower rates for similar investor services; or (7) the rates have remained
essentially constant over the years, while the fund's net assets have increased substantially.
Possible defenses to the various kinds of prima facie cases of unfairness that might be made out by plaintiffs, although not discussed
by Congress or the SEC, can be readily formulated. For example,
cost justification would seem to be an important defense in most cases.
If the adviser can show that his fund of necessity experiences a higher
cost ratio than comparable funds, or that another adviser charging
lower fees has been losing money, then his higher fees might be
justified. The performance of additional services or above-average performance might likewise justify higher fees. 14
CONCLUSION

The new mutual fund legislation, as it applies to management fees,
reflects an effort by Congress to alter the tests courts must apply in
suits brought by shareholders challenging the levels of management
compensation. Fiduciary principles can be applied to make shareholder
suits under section 36(b) an effective means of lowering management
fees. If years of legislative wrangling had any purpose, it is that the
shareholder must have an easier burden when he seeks to establish the
unfairness of advisory fees. Courts should interpret the new fiduciary
standard to widen their scope of inquiry as far as possible-beyond
shareholder ratification and the generally accepted industry rate structure, towards a more thorough examination of all relevant factors. The
fiduciary standard is sufficiently broad to allow courts to consider and
weigh all conflicting interests and arguments, and to determine whether
the challenged rates are fair. The legislation should be viewed as a
mandate to do so.
Robert N. Cowen
142 These justifications logically follow from the listing of determinants of fairness,
although there are as yet no cases in point.

